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THE RAVENSWOOD STRIKE 
Doug Hunt 
The declining years of a gold-mining town are fraught with the 
tensions and bitterness of unfulfilled hopes. As the supply of gold 
diminishes, surviving mining companies desperately seek more capital 
to maintain operations; some take the gamble of new and risky ventures, 
others try to cut costs by updating machinery and streamlining 
production overheads. A gradual population exodus occurs, leaving 
those who stay to savour the memory of elusive wealth. Local folklore 
offers varied reasons for the collapse of the field. As Geoffrey 
Blainey acknowledges. this is rarely attributed simply to the 
exhaustion of payable ore: "If only the company had bought new pumps, 
if they'd extended that drive at the 1600 foot level another seventy 
feet, if they'd sacked that mean manager." 
2 
In the ''merry-go-round of blame" attached to the demise of the 
North Queensland town of Ravenswood, one event stands out: an 
industrial dispute affecting principally the New Ravenswood company 
from November 1912 to July 1913. The villain of the piece, however, 
differs according to prejudice: on the one hand, Archibald Lawrence 
Wilson, general manager of New Ravenswood Limited, who at the height 
of the dispute allegedly declared, "I made this town and I'll bugger 
3 
it before I'll give in to the strikers!"; on the other hand, the 
workers themselves, led astray by "Irresponsible outside agitators" 
4 
from a "purely Socialistic" trade union. Of course, apportioning 
blame in any Industrial dispute is an exercise of dubious merit, more 
so when historical records are incomplete. Notwithstanding, a study 
of the Ravenswood strike does reveal some of the economic and social 
pressures affecting a small. Isolated gold-mining field in its twilight 
years. 
Visitors to Ravenswood in 1912 would have observed scant evidence 
of community decline. Indeed, a more likely Impression was one of 
solid prosperity. After the formation of the New Ravenswood company 
in 1898, the town had flourished. New timber, masonry and red brick 
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buildings - hotels, shops, residences and public utilities - all 
lent an aura of permanence to Ravenswood. A.L. Wilson's own house, 
an imposing structure overlooking the central town area, symbolised 
his position as shire council chairman, patron of societies and 
sporting clubs, and "uncrowned King of Ravenswood". This super-
ficial opulence, however, masked the underlying Insecurity of 
Ravenswood's wealth, as Roderick records: 
The population reached 4.707 in 1903. but its decline 
soon after mirrored the fortunes of the field. Many 
mines were returning lower yields to the ton; some were 
forced to close to avert financial losses. By 1911, 
Ravenswood's future was bleak: the population had 
decreased to 3,300; ore treatment was still high at 
36.000 tons, but the yield was the lowest since 1897; 
and the New Ravenswood Limited recorded its smallest , 
returns and dividend {&% percent) since its inception. 
That New Ravenswood was still profitable was due to the efficient 
management of the company. By constantly updating machinery and 
extraction methods, Wilson had reduced mining and milling costs by 
12^ 1 percent in three years. As a result the gold yield increased and 
a dividend of 183/4 percent was paid in June 1912. Earlier that 
year, however, the first portent of impending industrial conflict also 
appeared in Ravenswood: in February, following the visit of a union 
Q 
organiser, most workers joined the Amalgamated Workers' Association. 
Unlike their counterparts in the coal and base metal Industries, 
gold miners were not among the most militant of Australian unionists. 
Even while working for wages many retained hopes of sudden riches; 
they frequently supplemented paid employment by prospecting and working 
small claims. It was usually during recession, with easily-won gold 
exhausted, mining activity dominated by one or two large companies, 
and employment opportunities diminishing, that trade unions were 
successfully established. This was certainly the case in Ravenswood 
and, to a lesser extent, in the neighbouring reefing district of 
Charters Towers: previous attempts at industrial organisation had 
resulted in small, ephemeral unions devoted more to political 
9 
campaigning than to improving working conditions. By 1912. however. 
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Wilson's concern with cutting costs in the interests of economical 
mining had clearly placed him at loggerheads with his own 
employees, who made unfavourable comparisons between their own con-
ditions and those enjoyed by other North Queensland workers. In 
these circumstances, the AWA's enlistment of Ravenswood mine workers 
was hardly surprising. 
Since its formation in the mining districts of Chillagoe and 
Herberton in 1907, the AWA had earned a reputation for industrial 
assertiveness, energetic organisation and commitment to Labor politics. 
In 1911 it won the admiration of unionists throughout Australia by 
conducting a lengthy but successful strike leading to better conditions 
in the sugar industry. Enrolling miners, railway navvies, sugar 
workers and labourers generally, the northern union fostered an 
amalgamation movement culminating in a merger with the Australian 
Workers' Union in January 1913. In joining the AWA, Ravenswood 
employees thus became members of the most dynamic labour organisation 
in Queensland. Wilson recognised the potential threat posed to New 
Ravenswood by the AWA's entry to the field. Commenting on the general 
political and industrial situation in Queensland in March 1912 he 
apprehensively - though prematurely - forecast a local strike for 
"shorter hours of work and higher wages". 
In mid-May 1912 two rock drillers from the Sunset mine approached 
Wilson on behalf of all machine men engaged by New Ravenswood Limited, 
and requested a rise in wages from 10s. lOd. to lis. 8d per day, 
amounting to 5s. per week. The men had strong grounds for such a claim: 
at Charters Towers the rate of U s . 8d. had been paid for many years. 
Wilson agreed to grant the Increase, but terminated a customary bonus 
paid to men sinking shafts or winzes. Informing his London directors 
of the compromise, he confided that "in reality I am conceding nothing, 
but in a manner of speaking, I have saved the company a large sum 
owing to the fact that the men have not received the higher [Charters 
Towers] rate of wages since we started operations. Had we been 
paying this higher rate of wages since the Inception of the company. 
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12 it would have run into several thousands of pounds." 
Subsequently Wilson continued his economies by Installing labour-
saving machinery in the mines and improving the efficiency of milling 
operations. In August he proudly recorded the visit of a Charters 
Towers mine manager, who was Impressed with the New Ravenswood 
methods: "...although our reefs are much smaller and erratic, and we 
have a lesser number of men at work than he had, we extracted a 
13 larger tonnage than was the case at Charters Towers". When the 
power house drivers asked for an assistant for each shift in October, 
Wilson's response was characteristic: calculating that this demand 
would cost £636 per annum, "with no material advantage excepting that 
the work would be made easier", he chose Instead to purchase a 
modern air compressor to drive the piston drills "with a minimum 
consumption of steam". This would provide capacity for extra drills, 
effect a considerable saving in fuel, and make the work of the power 
house drivers much easier - "and so (I hope) avoid the trouble now 
14 impending and save the employment of extra assistants". Such 
measures, however, coincided with a decline in company profitability 
towards the end of 1912. On 11 November, noting that the Sunset mine 
was running at a loss. Wilson discharged 26 men (6 machine men, 16 
miners and 4 truckers) from the Sunset, 2 miners and 2 carpenters from 
the London North mine, and 3 truckers from the General Grant mine -
reducing the New Ravenswood workforce by some 15 percent. 
The workers' response to the retrenchments was prompt, if somewhat 
confused in its objectives. The following morning a deputation of 
local unionists presented Wilson with a demand for an Increase in 
wages for truckers from 8s. to 9s. per day, a move apparently planned 
for some time (together with a demand for reduced hours) but now 
stimulated by the dismissals. The mid-day train to Ravenswood brought 
the northern district secretary of the AWA. Jack Dash, hastily summoned 
from Townsville by the local workers. Leading another deputation to 
Wilson, Dash claimed that the dismissed employees were prominent AWA 
members, and charged the general manager with victimisation. This 
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assertion was countered with a frosty reply: "I Informed them that I 
had shortened hands in consequence of the poverty of the Sunset Mine 
and that I had no means of knowing who were and who were not members 
of this Union". 
The next day. Wednesday 13 November. Wilson again met with Dash 
and the president of the Ravenswood branch of the AWA with similar 
results. Accusations of victimisation were made and denied, and 
Wilson refused to give an undertaking to re-Instate the retrenched 
workers as more labour was required: "I pointed out that I was not 
likely to require any more men for some considerable time and that 
the engaging and discharging of miners was left entirely in the hands 
of the mine managers - and that I was not going to bind myself with 
a promise I might find difficult to fulfill". He did, however, offer 
to pay the truckers 8s. 4d. per day, the ruling rate at Charters 
Towers. Four days later a meeting of AWA members rejected this offer, 
widening the terms of the dispute by demanding a 9s. per day minimum 
for all workers and a reduction in hours from U5h. to 44 per week. 
On 19 November Wilson refused these demands, telling yet another 
deputation "some home truths which they did not relish". Within 
twenty-four hours a strike was declared and union picket lines set up 
around all New Ravenswood shafts and works. 
In the following week the dispute was extended to other Ravenswood 
companies. Involving workers employed by the trlbutors of the Grant 
and Sunset Extended and its treatment works, the Deep Mines mill. 
Yet not all workers downed tools: of the near 200-strong New 
Ravenswood workforce, approximately 70 non unionists remained at work. 
A further blow to the AWA's hopes of a general walk-out came when 
fourteen of New Ravenswood's eighteen engine drivers - all members of 
the Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association (FEDFA) -
refused to strike, defying an express Instruction from their union 
18 
executive to support the AWA. Subsequently, new rifts in the work-
force emerged, creating a bitter division in the Ravenswood community 
during the ensuing months. 
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In the meantime, there seemed little prospect of an early 
settlement of the dispute, especially when on 27 November 
Wilson refused any more meetings with the union: "I have already 
received five deputations from the AWA....and I do not feel disposed 
to meet any more....I have already conceded the truckers 8/4 per day 
19 
and do not Intend to concede any further". 
Wilson was clearly perplexed by the strike - the first serious 
dispute in the company's history and perhaps the only strike ever at 
20 Ravenswood. He appears to have genuinely believed that his employees 
were satisfied with their conditions and that the strikers were mis-
represented by "extremists" and "paid agitators''. No doubt he was 
encouraged in this belief by the less than universal support for 
direct action among the workers. Consequently, Wilson could only 
attribute the cause of the dispute to the notion that the AWA, "a 
21 political as well as an Industrial union", was bent on disruption. 
It is unlikely, however, that the strike was particularly welcomed 
by the AWA district and executive officials. The 1911 sugar trouble, 
the Brisbane general strike in January-February 1912, state elections 
in April 1912, and planning for amalgamation with the AWU, had 
already strained the energies and resources of the union. In the 
northern district, the AWA's main industrial objective in 1912-13 
was securing better conditions for its several thousand members in 
the Cloncurry copper mining district. Nevertheless, once the Ravenswood 
dispute began, union officials judged it expedient to endorse the claim 
for higher wages and a 44 hour week, which was, after all, union policy 
and long-standing practice In North Queensland mines. It is possible 
that the promise of improved wages and conditions was Instrumental in 
gaining Ravenswood members for the union early in 1912. Success in 
the strike would enhance the prestige of the AWA and secure the 
loyalty not merely of its local members but also of workers throughout 
the state - especially those in the north-western copper mines. Hence 
22 Wilson - "a stubborn foe of unionism" - must be forced to give in 
regardless of his company's capacity to concede the demands. Indeed, 
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it is probable that neither the AWA nor the Ravenswood miners even 
understood New Ravenswood's latest financial difficulties. Rather, 
as Roderick affirms, "the mining workforce saw the current 18^/4 per-
cent dividend, the Increased value of the yield, and nearly £35,000 
23 in general reserves, as strong grounds for wage claims". 
During December 1912 non-union "loyalists" continued with small-
scale development work in the mines and the annual overhaul of boilers 
and machinery. Christmas saw the arrival of several Ravenswood men 
from the Cloncurry district, enlivening the town's festive period 
and Intensifying feelings between strikers and "scabs". Epitomizing 
community divisions, brawls, slanging matches and stone-throwing 
were commonplace, culminating shortly before midnight on New Year's 
Eve with a revolver shot in the main street, wounding a 20 year old 
24 Cloncurry miner, Michael Gorman, in the leg. By mid-January, however, 
Ravenswood was "very quiet": heavy rain had further curtailed mining 
operations, most of the strikers had gone west looking for work, and 
25 the nearby Donnybrook and Erin's Hope United mines had closed down. 
With the New Ravenswood company now operating at a loss, its 
directors in London became increasingly concerned about the strike. 
Early in January 1913 they refused Wilson's request to transfer £25,000 
?6 
from the reserves to the company's working capital; a few weeks' 
later they suggested that operations by shut down at least temporarily. 
Wilson rejected this as "very unwise": 
In the first place, the men who have remained loyal and 
borne with all the contumely and intimidation from the 
strikers would have to be discharged, which would simply 
be playing into the hands of the AWA in as much as nothing 
would be more natural than for those men to be gathered 
into the ranks of the AWA. There would then be no question 
as to them being masters of the situation and the company 
their slaves. It is of the utmost importance that our 
loyalists should be kept on. and in the meantime I am 
hopeful of procuring a few more men.... 
By working as at present, although a loss may arise in the 
month during which there is no crushing there is a profit 
to be made when the crushing takes place, and this would 
recoup the previous losses either wholly or partially, or „_ 
at any rate be less of a loss than shutting down entirely. 
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Wilson struggled to keep New Ravenswood going. Early in February 
he travelled to Brisbane for Interviews with the Minister for Mines 
and Judge Macnaughton of the Industrial Court ("a personal friend of 
mine of many years' standing") with a view to settling the dispute 
under the recently-gazetted Industrial Peace Act. This legislation, 
passed by the Denham Liberal government in response to the Brisbane 
general strike, provided heavy penalties for strikes. In the 
capital, however. Wilson learnt that the necessary court machinery 
would not be ready until late April. He had more success - "with 
some difficulty and expense" - in recruiting non-union labour, 
engaging 16 miners in Brisbane and Gympie. By the end of February New 
Ravenswood had 95 men on the pay sheet, and had commenced crushing 
small amounts of ore. "I am striving day and night to break the 
strike", Wilson reported; "...it is only the fear and terror of the 
28 
agitators that is now keeping some of the men still out on strike". 
The stalemate nevertheless continued. On 7 April 1913 work 
resumed at the Grant and Sunset Extended following voluntary local 
arbitration which granted the men a 44 hour week but no wage Increase. 
Wilson deplored this decision as breaking the unity of the employers, 
but shortly afterwards also conceded the reduced hours to his 
loyalists, expressing the hope that this might induce a general 
29 
settlement of the dispute. Yet the union (now part of the AWU) 
remained firm on the wages issue: no more men returned to work and 
the strike at the New Ravenswood Limited dragged on through May and 
June. 
The pressures now began to tell on Wilson. His relations with the 
company staff, already strained by his obsession with costs, 
deteriorated. At the end of May Wilson's eldest son, who had been 
employed in December 1912 as surveyor and assistant metallurgist, was 
suspended by order of the board of directors in suspicious but 
30 
mysterious circumstances. In June the company secretary, J. Snelham, 
and the metallurgist, W.A. Caldwell resigned their positions, leading 
the directors to urge the general manager to "throw aside all petty 
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quarrels and jealousies and to work harmoniously and energetically with 
the other officers of the Company with a view to extricating the Company 
31 from its present position". 
The feeling engendered within the Ravenswood community by the 
strike exacerbated Wilson's worries. It was difficult for a man 
who had for so long enjoyed almost universal respect and popularity 
not to be troubled by the seething bitterness which set apart neigh-
bours and friends, and even divided families. While some workers 
were drawing regular wages. their former colleagues were getting 
by on meagre incomes in the form of Irregular strike pay. With the 
strike now in its sixth month, it is little wonder that both sides 
to the dispute were anxious for a settlement. The local branch 
secretary and several union members who had remained in town were 
reported to be in favour of declaring the strike off. and a return 
to work seemed imminent early in June when Wilson offered a minimum 
rate of 8s. 6d. per day. This olive branch was to no avail, 
however, as Jack Dash, the district secretary, could not be contacted: 
he had gone to Cloncurry, where a dispute over contracting and 
32 piecework had blossomed into a full-scale lock-out affecting 1500 men. 
Unable to secure official sanction for a settlement, the Ravenswood 
unionists again dug in their heels, and the strike was not called 
off until 16 July 1913, when a compulsory conference was summoned 
in Townsville by Judge Macnaughton. There it was agreed, on his 
recommendation, that the company should pay the 9s. per day for a 
33 
44 hour week, and that the men should resume work at once. 
To the Worker the strike settlement was "a complete victory for the 
34 
AWU": a claim which ignored local reality in Ravenswood. In fact 
the union had placed a very low priority on resolving the dispute. 
Indicative of this attitude was a report by Dash early in April 1913, 
at the height of the strike, that there were "no disputes of a 
35 
serious nature" in the northern district. In their determination to 
win a paper victory over New Ravenswood, the AWU neglected the 
employment prospects of its members. Indeed, after seven months' strike 
involving loss of pay and hardship, the men Involved gained little: 
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only 20 or 30 former strikers secured their old jobs; many 
returned to the Cloncurry district; others joined the general 
population drift from Ravenswood to the coastal towns and sugar 
districts. 
It is difficult to assess the significance of the strike in con-
tributing to the demise of Ravenswood. Wilson himself expressed 
reservations about the importance of the dispute as a cause of New 
Ravenswood's losses in 1913: development work confirmed the gloomy 
37 prospects of payable ore in the company's mines. Certainly the 
lengthy strike had placed further strains on a company struggling to 
make returns; the terms of settlement obviously meant higher costs in 
the future. The strike was most significant, however, in its effect 
on New Ravenswood's London directors: it was a determining factor in 
their decision not to provide more capital for the mines. 
For some years after 1913, New Ravenswood continued to extract 
gold, frequently winning enough to cover expenses - a tribute to 
Wilson's energy and commitment. However, rising costs and a 
shortage of materials made mining the narrow reefs increasingly uneco-
nomic. A number of local miners joined the armed forces during the 
Great War, and their replacements were less skilled. One by one the 
mines closed, until finally in 1917 the New Ravenswood company ceased 
operations and was liquidated. By then the strike - Ravenswood's 
"last hurrah" - was only a memory to the despondent residents who 
remained. 
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